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For The Attainment Of Peace Famous Speech by Golda Meir
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For The Attainment Of
Peace
by Golda Meir
Prime Minister Of Israel
At this opening of our parliamentary session, I wish to survey the
security and political conjuncture. In recent months, and in the past
weeks especially, the security situation has worsened seriously on the
southern front in particular, and the harmful effect of that is felt on
the other fronts also.
The main feature of this escalation and tension is an advanced and
dangerous stage of Soviet involvement in Egypt, at the beck and call of
Egyptian aggression and infractions of the cease-fire. There is no
precedent for this involvement in the history of Soviet penetration into
the Middle East, and it is encouraging Egypt in its plan to renew the war
of attrition and so move further along the path of its vaulting ambition
to vanquish Israel.
To understand the background, we must recall Nasser's declared decision,
in the spring of 1969, to abrogate the cease-fire and ignore the
cease-fire lines. It is typical of Egyptian policy all along its
war-mongering way. It reflects a basic doctrine--that Israel is an
exception in the family of nations: the rules that civilized countries
accept do not apply to Israel; an international obligation towards Israel
is to be undertaken only if there is no other option, no possible
alternative, and it may be renounced at the first chance. Routed on the
battlefield, you acquiesce in international proposals and arrangements
that enable you to rescue your regime. But should it appear that your
military strength has been restored enough to let you attack, you may
treat your undertaking or your signature as though it had never been. That
was the end of Egypt's cease-fire undertaking of 9 June 1967, entered into
at the instance of the Security Council. That was the end of Egypt's
earlier regional and international undertaking on matters concerning Egypt
and Israel. It is behaviour that illuminates the intentions and
credibility of Cairo in all that governs its attitude to peace with
Israel.
Armistice Torn to Shreds
Egypt did not do otherwise in respect of its signature of the Armistice
Agreement of 1949. In the eyes of its rulers, that was no more than a
temporary device to save Egypt from total collapse after its abortive
aggression and afford it a breathing-space to prepare for a new campaign.
Within a few years, Egypt--characteristically disavowing its international
pledges--had flouted the Security Council and jettisoned the principle of
freedom of navigation. With Nasser's accession to power, the Egyptians
emptied the Armistice Agreement of its content altogether by despatching
bands of murderers from the Gaza strip into Israel.
Nasser next started to subvert the regimes in those Arab States of which
he did not approve and which would not bow to his authority. He opened up
the region to Soviet penetration, he launched a plan to form a unified
military command of the Arab States bordering Israel, and pressed forward
with feverish preparations for a renewed assault upon us.
In 1956, his second armed threat to our existence was flung back. Once
more, he evinced an interest in mediation and international settlement,
for he needed them to engineer a withdrawal of Israel's forces from Sinai
and, after that, from Sharm e-Sheikh and the Gaza Strip. With his
knowledge and concurrence, the United Nations' Emergency Force was
deployed to ensure freedom of navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba and as a
guarantee that the Strip would serve no longer as a base for death-dealing
incursions into Israel.
For ten years, no plaint was heard from Cairo about the Emergency Force
and its functions. But Nasser was engaged all that time--with Soviet
help--in building up his army anew and in subversive and adventurous
activity throughout the region, culminating in the bloody war that he
fought, unsuccessfully, against the Yemenite people for five years on end.
Cease-Fire: Temporary Expedient
In 1967, convinced, it seems, that he had the strength to overcome Israel
in battle, he disavowed his international commitments wholesale, expelled
the Emergency Force, concentrated most of his troops in eastern Sinai,
re-instated his blockade of the Straits of Tiran, and prepared for a war
of annihilation against Israel--a war which, in his own words, would turn
back the clock to before 1948.
Up to 5 June 1967, he was entirely deaf to universal appeal to refrain
from plunging the Middle East into a third maelstrom of blood and
suffering. Four days later, his army undone, he was not slow to answer the
Security Council's call for a cease-fire, and so, again, avert calamity
for Egypt. The Council's cease-fire Resolution was not limited in time or
condition. Neither did Nasser attach any limitation of time or other term
to his assent.
Proof of his real designs is abundant in his subsequent declarations and
deeds. The Khartoum doctrine is unchanged: no peace, no recognition, no
negotiation. Israel must withdraw to the borders of 4 June 1967 and
thereafter surrender its sovereignty to the "Palestinian people". Only
with that twofold stipulation would the cease-fire be observed by Egypt.
The logic is sound: if the stipulations are kept, Nasser's aim is won, and
there will be no further cause for him to pursue aggression.
Nasser will not admit the concept of peace in its literal, humane and
Jewish sense. By our definition, and in international consciousness and
morality, peace means good neighbourliness and co-operation between
nations. According to his thinking, to invite Egypt to make peace with
Israel is to invite Egypt to accept capitulation and indignity.
That is the fount of the vortex of blood, destruction and anguish in which
the peoples of the Middle East have been drowning, decade after decade.
Quiet Must Be Reciprocal
On 17 March 1969, when Egyptian artillery began to bombard our soldiers in
the Canal zone, I announced, in this House, that--
The Arab States must realize that there can be quiet on the cease-fire
line only if there is quiet on both sides of it, and not just on one. We
want quiet, we want the cease-fire upheld. But this depends on the Arab
States. The maintenance of quiet must be reciprocal.
Egypt did not hearken to my words. Its aggressiveness was redoubled. At
the beginning of May, Nasser told his people that his forces had destroyed
sixty per cent of the line of fortifications which Israel had built along
the Canal, and would keep on until they had demolished what was left. In
the ensuing years, not only have our entrenchments been reinforced, but we
have hit hard at the Egyptian emplacements and foiled more than one
attempt to raid across the Canal.
Toward 'Rivers of Blood and Fire'
What Nasser describes as "a war of attrition" began in March 1969. On 30
March, he could say:
The time has passed when we required any soldier at the front who opened
fire on the enemy to account for his action, because we wanted to avoid
complications. Now the picture is different: if a soldier at the front
sees the enemy and does not open fire, he must answer for it.
In December 1969, he confirmed his preparedness for war or, in his own
phrase, "the advance of the Egyptian army through rivers of blood and
fire".
The Israel Defence Forces have punished this vainglorious aggression. I
shall not retell the tale of their courage and resource: the digging in,
the daring operations of the Air Force, the power of the armor. Aggression
has been repelled, the enemy's timetable upset and the pressure on our
front-line eased by our striking at vital enemy military targets along the
Canal and far behind it and confounding his plans for all-out war. True,
to our great sorrow, we have suffered losses in killed and wounded, but
our vigorous self-defence has thwarted Egypt's scheming and stultified its
endeavors to wear us down and shake our southern front.
British Out--Soviets in
Thus bankrupt, the Cairo regime had only the choice between accepting
Israel's constant call to return to reciprocal observance of the
cease-fire, as a stepping-stone to peace, or leaning more heavily still on
the Soviet Union to the point of asking it to become operationally
involved, so that Egypt might carry on the war of attrition,
notwithstanding the unpleasant repercussions of that involvement.
Egypt chose the second course.
In many of his speeches, Nasser claims the credit for ending British power
and Egypt's subjugation to it. But the same leader who promised his people
full independence of any foreign Power has preferred to renew its
dependence and subservience rather than make peace with Israel, rather
than honour the cease-fire. In his plight, he elects to conceal from his
people the truth that, in place of the British, the Soviets are invading
the area. This is the pass to which blindness and hatred have brought the
Egyptian revolution.
Soviet penetration did not start yesterday or the day before. Its
beginning could be seen in the mid-fifties, in a strengthening of
influence by the provision of economic aid and weaponry on the easiest
terms.
In May 1967, the Soviet Union provocatively spawned baseless rumours of
Israeli concentrations on the Syrian border. This was a major link in the
chain of developments that led to the Six-Day War. When the fighting was
over, Moscow displayed no readiness to counsel the Arabs to close the
chapter of violence and open one of regional cooperation--although, to
extricate Nasser, it had voted for the unconditional cease-fire
Resolution.
In his speech of 1 May 1970, Nasser confessed that, only three days after
Egypt had submitted to that Resolution, the Soviets agreed to re-arm his
forces.
His words:
On 12 June - and now I can reveal it - I received a Note from Brezhnev,
Kosygin and Podgorny, in which they promised to support the Arab nation
and restore Egypt's armed forces, without any payment, to their pre-war
level.
Thus we were able to withstand and overcome our plight and rehabilitate
our armed forces anew.
The Wherewithal for War
Within the past three years, the Soviet Union has supplied Egypt, Syria
and Iraq with two thousand tanks and eight hundred fighter aircraft,
besides other military equipment, to an overall value of some 3.5 billion
dollars, two-thirds to Egypt alone. This armament was purveyed with
practically no monetary requital. Thousands of Soviet specialists are
engaged in training the Egyptian forces. Soviet advisers are guiding and
instructing the Egyptian forces within units and bases even during combat.
It is hard to believe that Nasser would have dared to resume aggression in
March 1969 on a large scale without Russian authorization. It is harder to
believe that, in May-June 1969, he would have abrogated the cease-fire
without it. Not only did the Soviet Union not use its capacity to move him
to comply again with the cease-fire; it even encouraged him to step up his
belligerency. A conspicuous example of this disinclination to make its
contribution to the restoration of quiet is Moscow's rejection of the
American proposal, in mid-February 1970, for a joint appeal by the Four
Powers to the parties in the region to respect the cease-fire.
It is widely assumed that the Soviet Union is not anxious for an all-out
war, in which its protege, Egypt, would be worsted in battle again, but
that, at the same time, it eschews a cease-fire as being a stage in
progress towards peace. So it would prefer the contribution of something
in-between: frontier clashes, indecisive engagements, ongoing tensions,
which would allow it to exploit Egyptian dependence to the hilt, and so
further its regional penetration and aims. And, by exerting military and
political pressure on Israel, it seeks to satisfy Egypt's needs in a
manner that will not entail the danger of another Egyptian reverse or of a
"needless" peace.
Not content with bolstering Nasser's policy of aggression and war, the
Soviet Union has embarked upon a campaign of antisemitic propaganda within
its own borders and of venomous vilification of Israel through all its
communication media and in international forums. The Soviets have gone so
far in slander as to label us Nazis: without shame or compunction, they
charge the Jews with taking part in pogroms organized by the Czarist
regime, of collaborating with the Nazis. They represent Trotsky as a
Zionist. They conduct "scientific" research which has "discovered" that
there is no such thing as a Jewish people.
The purpose is twofold: to intimidate Soviet Jewry and to prepare the
psychological ground for any and every mischief against Israel.
Soviet Involvement Deepens
The failure of the war of attrition, the insistence of Nasser's pleas,
have persuaded the Soviets to extend their involvement. At the moment
when, in New York and Washington, their representatives were meeting
representatives of the Western Powers to discuss a renewal of the Jarring
mission and a peace settlement, Soviet ships were sailing to Egypt, laden
with SA-3 ground-to-air missiles, and thousands of Soviet experts were
arriving to install, man and operate the batteries. In December 1969,
signs of the entrenched bases of ground-to-air missiles could be discerned
in the Canal and other zones. We estimate that there are already about
twenty such bases in the heart of Egypt.
In mid-April, Soviet involvement went one step further--and the gravest so
far. Soviet pilots, from bases at their disposal on Egyptian soil, began
to carry out operational missions over wide areas. With that defensive
coverage of their rear, the Egyptians could mount their artillery
bombardment in the Canal zone on a scale unparalleled since it was started
in March 1969.
Speaking on 1 May on the intensification of the war against Israel, Nasser
told his audience:
In the last fifteen days a change has taken place. As we can see, our
forces are taking the initiative in operations.
And in the same speech:
All this is due to the aid which the Soviet Union has furnished, and it is
clear that you have heard many rumours and are destined to hear many more.
On 20 May, Nasser admitted for the first time, in an interview for the
German newspaper Die Welt, that Soviet pilots were flying jet planes of
the Egyptian air force and might clash with ours.
Thus the Middle East is plumbing a new depth of unease. The Soviet Union
has forged an explosive link in a chain of acts that is dragging the
region into an escalation of deadly warfare and foredooms any hope of
peace-making.
We have informed Governments of the ominous significance of this new phase
in Soviet involvement. We have explained that a situation has developed
which ought to perturb not only Israel, but every state in the free world.
The lesson of Czechoslovakia must not be forgotten. If the free world--and
particularly the United States, its leader--can pass on to the next item
on its agenda without any effort to deter the Soviet Union from selfishly
involving itself so largely in a quarrel with which it has no concern,
then it is not Israel alone that is imperilled, but no small nation, no
minor nation, can any longer dwell in safety within its frontiers.
The Government of Israel has made it plain, as part of its basic policy to
defend the State's being and sovereignty whatever betide, that the Israel
Defence Forces will continue to hold the cease-fire line on the southern
as on other fronts, and not permit it to be sapped or breached.
For that purpose, it is essential to stop the deployment of the
ground-to-air missile pads which the Egyptians are trying to set up
adjacent to the cease-fire line; the protection of our forces entrenched
there to prevent the breaching of the front depends on that. No serious
person will suspect Israel of wanting to provoke, or being interested in
provoking, Soviet pilots integrated into the Egyptian apparatus of war,
but neither will anyone in his senses expect us to allow the Egyptian army
to carry through its aggressive plans without the Israel Defence Forces
using all their strength and skill to defeat them, even if outside factors
are helping to carry them through.
Arms Balance Must Be Restored
All this means that our search for the arms indispensable for our defence
has become more urgent, more vital. When we asked to be allowed to buy
more aircraft from the United States, we based ourselves on the reality
that the balance of power had been shaken by the enormous arsenals flowing
from the Soviet Union to Egypt free of charge. Since the President of the
United States announced deferment of his decision on that critical point,
it has, as I have said, become known that SA-3 batteries, with Soviet
crews, have been set up in Egypt and Soviet pilots activated in
operational flights. This adds a new and portentous dimension of
imbalance, and the need to redress the equilibrium becomes more pressing
and crucial.
We have emphasized to peace-loving Governments the necessity to bring
their influence to bear and make their protests heard against a Soviet
involvement which so dangerously aggravates tension in the Middle East. I
have heard what the President of the United States said in his press
conference on 8 May about the alarming situation, in the light of reports
that Soviet pilots had been integrated into Egypt's air force. He went on
to say that the United States was watching the situation, and, if it
became clear that the reports were true and the escalation continued, this
would drastically shift the balance of power and make it necessary for the
United States to re-appraise its decision as to the supply of jets to
Israel. He also said that the United States had already made it perfectly
plain that it was in the interests of peace in the Middle East that no
change be permitted in the balance of forces, and that the United States
would abide by that obligation.
On 24 March of this year, the Secretary of State, in the President's name,
declared that the United States would not allow the security of Israel to
be jeopardised, and that, if steps were taken that might shake the present
balance of power or if, in his view, international developments justified
it, the President would not hesitate to reconsider the matter.
I do not have to tell you that I attach great importance to these
statements. But, I must say, with the utmost gravity, that delay in
granting our wish hardly rectifies the change for the worse in the balance
of power that the new phase in Soviet involvement, with all its attendant
perils, has entailed.
There is close and continuous contact between ourselves and the US
authorities in the matter. Last week, the Foreign Minister had talks with
the President and the Secretary of State: he was told that the urgent and
detailed survey mentioned by the President four weeks ago is not yet
complete, but was assured that the official United States declarations of
24 March and 8 May on the balance of power held entirely good.
In all our contacts, we have stressed how important the time factor is,
for any lag in meeting our requirements can harm our interests and is
likely to be interpreted by our enemies as encouraging their aggression
and by the Soviet Union as condoning its intensified involvement. I find
it inconceivable that the United States will not carry out its declared
undertaking.
Other Fronts: Rampant Terrorism
Of late, there has been a rise in aggressive activity on the other fronts
as well. Nasser is trying to step up the effectiveness of the eastern
front, and Egypt's military policy has undoubtedly affected the situation
on the other fronts. This destructive consequence is visible not only in
terrorist operations against Israel from Jordan, Syria and Lebanon, but
also in the strategy of neighbouring Governments and in domestic upheavals
in Jordan and Lebanon.
The terrorist organization in Syria is a section of the Syrian army,
acting under Government directives. In Jordan and Lebanon, terrorist
domination has so expanded as to become a threat to the existence and
authority of the Governments. In both countries, the Governments have
vainly sought to reconcile opposites: their own authority and the presence
and activity of the terrorist organizations. Such attempts could meet with
no more than a semblance of success. More than once, the Governments
seemed about to confront the organizations but each time recoiled from the
encounter.
In Jordan as in Lebanon, the terrorists have taken heart from Nasser.
Through his support, direct and indirect, they have strengthened their
position. The authorities have compromised with them at Israel's expense,
allowing them no little latitude--against Israel. They have been accorded
a recognized status, which guarantees them freedom of action. The entire
world knows of "the Cairo Agreement" between the terrorists and the
Lebanese Government, achieved through the mediation and under the auspices
of Egypt: It allows them to pursue their activities openly, in areas
allotted to them, in coordination with the Lebanese authorities and army,
as well as elsewhere along the border.
Between the beginning of January and 20 May, there were eleven hundred
enemy operations along the Jordanian front. The Fatah and other
organizations dug themselves in along the length of the Israel-Lebanon
frontier, and it has become a focus of murder and sabotage: terrorists
were responsible for a hundred and forty inroads along that frontier.
After a series of such acts, among them Katyusha fire on inoffensive
civilians in Kiryat Shmona and other places, terrorism reached a climax on
22 May in the calculated murder, from ambush, of schoolchildren, teachers
and other passengers in a school-bus.
There is no viler example of the vicious mentality and lethal policy of
the terrorist organizations and their instructors in the Arab capitals
than the development along the Lebanese front. Until the Six-Day War, it
had been the most tranquil of all the frontiers. Even afterwards, the
tension which marked the cease-fire lines and borders with Egypt and
Jordan was absent there, until the Fatah and their backers entrenched
themselves and decided that the Lebanese border, too, must be set aflame.
And there is another aim--common to Cairo and Damascus for a number of
years--which has not been wanting in terrorist policy: to prejudice
Lebanon's independence and disturb the delicate equipoise between its two
communities. By accepting the Cairo Agreement in November 1969, and
allowing the establishment of terrorist bases in its territory, Lebanon
has been progressively endangering its independence, as Jordan did before.
Endlessly provoked by terrorists from Lebanon, we retaliated a number of
times against Fatah bases. The ever closer cooperation between Beirut and
the terrorist organizations makes more and more evident the responsibility
of the Lebanese Government. It cannot be shrugged off. We shall keep on
demanding that Beirut use its power to halt aggression from its territory
and do its bounden duty in restoring tranquillity.
Israel is interested in the stability of democracy in Lebanon, in its
progress, integrity and peace. On 22 May, radio Beirut announced that
"Lebanon has often stated that it is not prepared on any account to act as
a policeman guarding Israel". So long as Lebanon evades its answerability
and allows the terrorists to indulge in aggression and murder, the
Government of Israel will do its bounden duty and, by all necessary
measures, defend the welfare of Israel's citizens, its highways, towns and
villages.
The Aspiration to Peace
We must view recent happenings against the whole background of our
struggle, since the Six-Day War, to realize Israel's highest aspiration,
the aspiration to peace.
To our intense disappointment, we learnt on the morrow of the Six-Day War
that the rulers of the Arab States and the Soviet Union were not prepared
to put an end to the conflict. Witness authoritative fulminations by the
Arab Governments, the resolutions of Khartoum, the Soviet Union's
identification with that policy, its assiduous efforts to rehabilitate the
Arab armies with lavish and unstinted aid. We learnt that our struggle for
peace would be prolonged, full of pain and sacrifice. We decided--and the
nation was with us, to a man--resolutely to defend the cease-fire lines
against all aggression and simultaneously press on with our strivings to
attain peace.
It is our way not to glorify ourselves but to render a sober and
restrained account of our policy, not hiding the hard truth from the
people, even if it be grievous. The people and the world know that there
is no word of truth in Egypt's fabrication of resounding victories. The
main efforts of the Egyptian army have been repelled by the Israel Defence
Forces. All claims of success in breaking our line are false. Most
attempted sorties by Egyptian planes into our air-space have been undone,
and the Egyptians are paying a heavy price for every venture to clash with
our Air Force. We control the area all along the Canal cease-fire line
more firmly and strongly than ever.
Soviet involvement has not deterred, and will not deter, Israel from
exercising its recognized right to defend the cease-fire lines until
secure boundaries are agreed upon within the compass of the peace we so
much desire.
Had its aggression gained the political objectives set, Egypt could by now
have celebrated victory. But Nasser and the Soviets have not realized
those aims.
Three years after the Six-Day War, we can affirm that two fundamental
principles have become a permanent part of the international
consciousness: Israel's right to stand fast on the cease-fire lines, not
budging until the conclusion of peace that will fix secure and recognized
boundaries; and its right to self-defence and to acquire the equipment
essential to defence and deterrence.
I have, on several occasions, explained the differences in appraisal and
approach between ourselves and friendly States and Powers. I have no
intention of claiming that they have entirely disappeared. Nevertheless,
we cannot allow them to overshadow the recognition of those twin
principles, any more than we may overlook the systematic plotting of our
enemies to weaken that international consciousness and isolate Israel.
The Economic Front
Another front that will test our power to hold out is the economic. How we
hold out militarily and politically is contingent on the degree of our
success in surmounting economic troubles.
Our victories in three wars, our robust military stance in the interim
periods of what, by comparison, has been tranquillity, as well as through
these present difficult days, could never have been won without a
solidly-based economy, a high educational standard of soldier and
civilian, a high technological level of worker in every branch. We owe it
to an unprecedentedly rapid economic development and expansion that the
national income of tiny Israel almost equals that of Egypt, with a
population tenfold ours and more. We must, by all necessary measures,
maintain that advantage.
The central problem of the moment arises from an unfavourable balance of
payments and the resultant shortage of foreign currency. The deficit in
our balance of payments may be attributed, primarily, to the vastly
greater defence imports: if those has stayed at their pre-Six-Day-War
level, we would by now be nearing economic independence.
Until 1968, capital imports, which pay for any excess of imports over
exports, had sufficed not only to cover the deficit but also to amass
considerable reserves of foreign currency. Since then, they are no longer
enough. There is a risk of a drop in foreign currency reserves which might
prevent our sustaining the level of imports imperative for the smooth
working of the economy under conditions of full employment and meeting at
the same time our defence requirements.
We must, therefore, in the national interest, make every endeavour and be
prepared for every sacrifice demanded for the solving of this problem.
Which means that we must also restrict the growth of imports, especially
of imports destined for private and public consumption and not for
security. The standard of living has risen in the last three years by more
than twenty-five per cent: in this period of emergency, our efforts to
economize must be mirrored in pegging a standard of living that may have
climbed too steeply.
One of the "unavoidables" is to cut down the State Budget and saddle the
public with taxes, charges and compulsory loans on no small scale. This
action was taken only in the last few weeks, and we hope that it will have
the desired and sufficient effect. If it does not, if we find that imports
have not been curbed enough or exports have not risen enough, that
consumption keeps expanding and the deficit swelling, we will not shrink
from further action.
Let me add that this implies no change in our determination, even in an
emergency that tightens all belts, not to neglect the advancement of the
lower-income strata; this year, too, we have adopted a number of
significant measures to better their lot, and we shall continue to do so.
The policy is no easy one for those who have to discharge it, nor is it a
light burden that it places on the public's shoulders. The understanding
and maturity with which the man-in-the-street has accepted these stern
dispositions are most commendable: only a negligible minority has tried to
circumvent them.
Our economic targets are far from simple of attainment. The ongoing
development of the economy, the absorption of newcomers and enormous
defence expenditure present a challenge greater than we could face alone.
We are deeply grateful, therefore, for the staunch cooperation of world
Jewry and the assistance of friendly nations. I believe that we can
continue to rely on that help, but, for moral and practical reasons alike,
we cannot make demands on others if we do not first do our own share. So
we must adjust our way of life, in everything that concerns wages,
incomes, consumption, savings, productivity, personal effort and outlay,
each of us playing his full part, to what the overriding national purpose
dictates.
Pursuit of an Elusive Peace
The aspiration to peace is not only the central plank in our platform, it
is the cornerstone of our pioneering life and labour. Ever since renewal
of independence, we have based all our undertakings of settlement and
creativity on the fundamental credo that we did not come to dispossess the
Arabs of the Land but to work together with them in peace and prosperity,
for the good of all.
It is worth remembering, in Israel and beyond, that at the solemn
proclamation of statehood, under savage onslaught still, we called upon
the Arabs dwelling in Israel--
To keep the peace and to play their part in building the State on the
basis of full and equal citizenship and due representation in all its
institutions, provisional and permanent.
We extended "the hand of peace and goodneighbourliness to all the States
around us and to their peoples", and we appealed to them "to cooperate in
mutual helpfulness with the independent Jewish nation in its Land and in a
concerted effort for the advancement of the entire Middle East".
On 23 July 1952, when King Farouk was deposed and the young officers, led
by General Naguib, seized power in Egypt, hope sprang up in Israel that a
new leaf had been turned in the neighbourly relations between Egypt and
ourselves, that we were entering an age of peace and cooperation. Prime
Minister David Ben-Gurion, addressing the Knesset on 18 August 1952, said:
The State of Israel would like to see a free, independent and progressive
Egypt, and we bear Egypt no grudge for what it did to our forefathers in
Pharoah's days, or even for what it did to us four years ago. Our goodwill
towards Egypt--despite the Farouk Government's foolish behaviour towards
us--has been demonstrated throughout the months of Egypt's involvement in
a difficult conflict with a world Power. And it never occurred to us to
exploit those difficulties and to attack Egypt or take revenge, as Egypt
did to us upon the establishment of the State. And insofar as Egypt's
present rulers are trying to uproot internal corruption and move their
country forward to cultural and social progress, we extend to them our
sincerest wishes for the success of their venture.
The answer came soon. Asked about Ben-Gurion's call for peace, Egypt's
Prime Minister evaded the question, claiming that he knew no more than
what he had read in the newspapers. Azzam, Secretary-General of the Arab
League, said: "Ben-Gurion gave free flight to his imagination, which saw
the invisible" [Al-Misri, 20 August 1952]. On 23 August 1952, Al-Ahram
explained that Israel had been forced to seek peace by a tottering
economy, and proceeded:
In the past, on a number of occasions, Israel tried, at sessions of the
Conciliation Commission, to sit with the Arabs around the table, so as to
settle existing problems. The Arabs refused, because they did not
recognize the existence of the Jews, which is based on extortion.
We have never wearied of offering our neighbours an end to the bloody
conflict and the opening of a chapter of peace and cooperation. All our
calls have gone unheeded. Our proposals have been rejected in mockery and
hatred. The policy of warring against us has persisted, with brief pauses,
and thrice in a single generation forced hostilities upon us.
On 1 March 1957, in the name of the Government of Israel, I announced in
the United Nations the withdrawal of our forces from the territories
occupied in the Sinai Campaign. I concluded with these words:
Can we, from now on--all of us--turn over a new leaf, and, instead of
fighting with each other, can we all, united, fight poverty and disease
and illiteracy? Is it possible for us to put all our efforts and all our
energy into one single purpose, the betterment and progress and
development of all our lands and all our peoples? I can here pledge the
Government and the people of Israel to do their part in this united
effort. There is no limit to what we are prepared to contribute so that
all of us, together, can live to see a day of happiness for our peoples
and see again a great contribution from our region to peace and happiness
for all humanity.
Ten years went by, of fedayun activity, and once again we were confronted
with the hazard of a surprise attack by Egypt, which had assembled
powerful columns in eastern Sinai. The Six-Day War was fought, but, when
its battles ended, we did not behave as men drunk with victory, we did not
call for vengeance, we did not demand the humiliation of the conquered. We
knew that our real celebration would be on the day that peace comes.
Instantly, we turned to our neighbours, saying:
Our region is now at a crossroads: let us sit down together, not as
victors and conquered, but as equals; let us negotiate, let us determine
secure and agreed boundaries, let us write a new page of peace,
goodneighbourliness and cooperation for the profit of all the nations of
the Middle East.
The call was sounded over and again in Government statements, in
declarations by the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister, the Foreign
Minister, the Minister of Defence and other Ministers--in the Knesset and
in the United Nations, through all communication media. It was borne by
emissaries, statesmen, authors, journalists, educators and by every
means--public or covert--which seemed likely to bring it to our
neighbours' ears.
The Knesset will not expect me to review the manifold efforts and attempts
to establish any kind of contact with statesmen and competent authorities
in the Arab countries. The people with whom we have tried, and shall again
try, to open a dialogue do not want publicity. In this sensitive field, a
hint of publication can be enough to extinguish a spark of hope.
Imagination and a broad outlook are required, but imagination must not be
allowed to become blindness. Patience and close attention are needed if
seeds that have yet to germinate are to yield fruit in the course of time
and not be sterilized by the glare of publicity.
At all events, the Government of Israel will neglect no opportunity to
develop and foster soundings and contacts that may be of value in blazing
a trail, always with scrupulous regard for the secrecy of the contacts, if
our interlocutors so prefer.
But what have been the reactions of Arab leaders, so far, to our public
proposals for peace? Here are some outstanding examples:
* On 26 July 1967, Hussein declared: "The battle which began on 5 June is
only one battle in what will become a long war."
* On 1 November 1967, the Prime Minister of Israel, the late Levi Eshkol,
enumerated five principles of peace, and Nasser's reply on 23 November
was: "The Arabs hold steadfastly to the Khartoum decision--no peace, no
recognition and no negotiation with Israel."
* From November 1967 until July 1968, Israel sent forth its calls for
peace again and again, and on 16 July the Egyptian Foreign Minister
replied:
With regard to Arab policy, I have always reiterated what was agreed upon
at Khartoum, that we are not prepared to recognize Israel, to negotiate
with it or to sign a peace with it.
* On 8 November 1968, Foreign Minister Abba Eban presented to the General
Assembly of the United Nations a detailed peace programme in nine clauses:
- The establishment of a just and lasting peace;
- The determination of secure and recognized borders;
- Security agreements, including non-aggression pacts;
- Borders open to travel and trade;
- Freedom of navigation in international waterways;
- A solution to the refugee problem through a conference of
representatives of the countries of the Middle East, the countries
contributing to refugee upkeep, and the United Nations Specialized
Agencies to draw up a five-year plan; the conference could be convened
even before general peace negotiations began;
- The Holy Places of Christianity and Islam in Jerusalem to be placed
under the responsibility of the respective faiths, with the aim of
formulating agreements which will give force to their universal character;
- Mutual recognition of sovereignty;
- Regional cooperation in development projects for the good of the whole
region.
The Arab leaders disregarded the programme and did not even favour it with
reply or comment.
* On 17 March 1969--the day on which I assumed my present office--I
re-emphasized the principles of peace, saying:
We are prepared to discuss peace with our neighbours any day and on all
matters.
Nasser's reply, three days later, was:
There is no voice transcending the sounds of war, and there must not be
such a voice--nor is there any call holier than the call to war.
* In the Knesset - on 5 May 1969, on 8 May and on 30 June--I re-enunciated
our readiness--
To enter immediately into negotiations, without prior conditions, with
every one of our neighbours, to reach a peace settlement.
The retort of the Arab States was swift. The commentators of Damascus,
Amman and Cairo stigmatized peace as "surrender"and heaped scorn on
Israel's proposals. Take, for example, this from Al-Destour, a leading
Jordanian newspaper, of 15 June 1969:
Mrs. Meir is prepared to go to Cairo to hold discussions with President
Abdul Nasser but, to her sorrow, has not been invited. She believes that
one fine day a world without guns will emerge in the Middle East. Golda
Meir is behaving like a grandmother telling bedtime stories to her
grandchildren.
And that was the moment for Nasser to announce abrogation of the
cease-fire agreements and non-recognition of the cease-fire lines.
* On 19 September 1969, the Foreign Minister of Israel appealed in the
United Nations to the Arab States--
To declare their intention to establish a lasting peace, to eliminate the
twenty-one-year-old conflict, to hold negotiations for detailed agreement
on all the problems with which we are faced.
He referred to Israel's affirmation to Ambassador Jarring on 2 April:
Israel accepts the Security Council Resolution (242) calling for the
promotion of agreement for the establishment of a just and lasting peace,
reached through negotiation and agreement between the Governments
concerned. Implementation of the agreement will commence when accord has
been reached on all its provisions.
* On 24 September 1969, during my visit to the United States, I was happy
to hear that a statement had been made on behalf of the Egyptian Foreign
Minister, then in New York, that Egypt was prepared to enter into
Rhodes-style peace talks with Israel. I responded forthwith that Israel
was willing and, as previously recorded, was prepared to discuss the
establishment of a true peace with Egypt at any time and without prior
conditions.
Within a few hours, an authoritative dementi came from Cairo. Any Egyptian
readiness to enter into Rhodes-style talks was officially denied. The
spokesman of the Egyptian Government termed the statement to that effect
an "imperialist lie."
* On 18 December 1969, the Knesset approved the present Government's basic
principles. I quote the following passages:
The Government will steadfastly strive to achieve a durable peace with
Israel's neighbours, founded on peace treaties achieved by direct
negotiations between the parties. Agreed, secure and recognized borders
will be laid down in the treaties. The treaties will assure cooperation
and mutual aid, the solution of any problem that may be a stumbling-block
on the path to peace, and the avoidance of all aggression, direct and
indirect. Israel will continue to be willing to negotiate--without prior
conditions from either side--with any of the neighbouring States for the
conclusion of such a treaty ... The Government will be alert for any
expression of willingness amongst the Arab nations for peace with Israel
and will welcome and respond to any readiness for peace from the Arab
States. Israel will persevere in manifesting its peaceful intentions and
in explaining the clear advantages to all the peoples of the area of
peaceful co-existence, without aggression or subversion, without
territorial expansion or intervention in the freedom and internal regimes
of the States in the area.
* In my address to the Knesset on 26 December 1969, in the Foreign
Minister's address to the Knesset on 7 April 1970, and in a series of
local press interviews on the eve of Passover and on the eve of
Independence Day, that resolve was reaffirmed:
Day or night, if any sign whatever were to be seen, we would have
responded to it.
* Ambassador Jarring came and asked what Israel's response would be if he
were to invite the Foreign Ministers to Cyprus or Geneva--and there was no
hesitation on our part. He asked about Rhodes, and we said--let it be
Rhodes.
* In an interview published in Ma'ariv on 20 April I said:
We have no direct contacts with Egypt, but there are friends who travel
around the world, to this place or that, statesmen who hate neither Israel
nor Egypt. They tried to find a bridge, but could not.
On the contrary, there have been echoes of Nasser's speech of 1 May 1970,
making even the resumption of the cease-fire conditional on our total
withdrawal and the return of the Palestinians to Israel.
Stop the Killing!
These are but a few of our recurring solicitations for peace. We have not
retracted one of them: we have not wearied of reiterating, day in, day
out, our preparedness for peace: we have not abandoned hopes of finding a
way into the hearts of our neighbours, though they yet dismiss our appeals
with open animosity.
Today again, as the guns thunder, I address myself to our neighbours: Stop
the killing, end the fire and bloodshed which bring tribulation and
torment to all the peoples of the region! End rejection of the cease-fire,
end bombardment and raids, end terror and sabotage!
Even Russian pilots will not contrive to destroy the cease-fire lines, and
certainly they will not bring peace. The only way to permanent peace and
the establishment of secure and recognized boundaries is through
negotiations between the Arab States and ourselves, as all sovereign
States treat one another, as is the manner of States which recognize each
other's right to existence and equality, as is the manner of free peoples,
not protectorates enslaved to foreign Powers or in thrall to the dark
instincts of war, destruction and ruin.
To attain peace, I am ready to go at any hour to any place, to meet any
authorized leader of any Arab State--to conduct negotiations with mutual
respect, in parity and without pre-conditions, and with a clear
recognition that the problems under controversy can be solved. For there
is room to fulfill the national aspirations of all the Arab States and of
Israel as well in the Middle East, and progress, development and
cooperation can be hastened among all its nations, in place of barren
bloodshed and war without end.
If peace does not yet reign, it is from no lack of willingness on our
part: it is the inevitable outcome of the refusal of the Arab leadership
to make peace with us. That refusal is still a projection of reluctance to
be reconciled to the living presence of Israel within secure and
recognized boundaries, still a product of the hope, which flickers on in
their hearts, that they will accomplish its destruction. And this has been
the state of things since 1948, long before the issue of the territories
arose in the aftermath of the Six-Day War.
Moreover, if peace does not yet reign, it is equally not because of any
lack of "flexibility" on our part, or because of the so-called "rigidity"
of our position.
That position is: cease-fire, agreement and peace. The Arab Governments
preach and practise no cease-fire, no negotiation, no agreement and no
peace. Which of the two attitudes is stubborn and unyielding? The Arab
Governments' or ours?
The November 1967 UN Resolution
There are some, the Arabs included, who claim that we have not accepted
the United Nations Resolution of 22 November 1967, and that the Arabs
have. In truth, the Arabs only accepted it in a distorted and mutilated
interpretation of their own, as meaning an instant and absolute withdrawal
of our forces, with no commitment to peace. They were ready to agree to an
absolute Israeli withdrawal, but the Resolution stipulates nothing of the
kind. According to its text and the exegesis of its compilers, the
Resolution is not self-implementing. The operative clause calls for the
appointment of an envoy, acting on behalf of the Secretary-General, whose
task would be to "establish and maintain contact with the States concerned
in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and
accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in
this Resolution." On 1 May 1968, Israel's Ambassador at the United Nations
announced as follows:
In declarations and statements made publicly and to Ambassador Jarring,
the Government of Israel has indicated its acceptance of the Security
Council's Resolution for the promotion of an agreement to establish a just
and durable peace. I am authorised to reaffirm that we are willing to seek
an agreement with each Arab State, on all the matters included in that
Resolution. More recently, we accepted Ambassador Jarring's proposal to
arrange meetings between Israel and each of its neighbours, under his
auspices, and in fulfillment of his mandate under the guide-lines of the
Resolution to advance a peace agreement. No Arab State has yet accepted
that proposal.
This announcement of our Ambassador was reported to the House by the
Foreign Minister on 29 May 1968 and to the General Assembly in September
1969. It opened the way for Ambassador Jarring to invite the parties to
discuss any topic which any of them saw fit to raise, including issues
mentioned in the Resolution. The Arabs and those others who assert that we
are preventing progress towards peace in terms of the Resolution have no
factual basis for so asserting. They seek merely to throw dust in the
world's eyes, to cover up their guilt and deceive the world into thinking
that we are the ones who are retarding peace.
Talks Without Pre-Conditions
It is also argued that, by creating facts on the ground, we are laying
down irrevocable conditions which render negotiations superfluous or make
it more difficult to enter into them. This contention, too, is wholly
mistaken and unfounded. The refusal of the Arab States to enter into
negotiations with us is simply an extension of their long-drawn-out
intransigence. It goes back to before the Six-Day War, before there were
any settlements in the administered territories.
After that fighting, we said--and we left no room for doubt--that we were
willing to enter into negotiations with our neighbours with no
pre-conditions on either side. This willingness does not signify that we
have no opinions, thoughts or demands, or that we shall not exercise our
right to articulate them in the discussions, as our neighbours are
entitled to no less.
Nasser and Hussein, for example, in their official replies to Dr. Jarring,
said that they saw the partition borders of 1947 as constituting
definitive frontiers. I do not have to explain our attitude to that
answer, but we do not insist that, in negotiating with us, the Arab States
forfeit their equal right to make any proposal that they think fit, just
as they cannot annul from the outset our right to express, in the
discussions, any ideas or proposals which we may form. And there assuredly
is no moral or political ground for demanding that we refrain from any
constructive act in the territories, even though the Arab Governments
reject the call for peace and make ready for war.
There is yet another argument touching on our insistence on direct
negotiations: it is as devoid as are the others of any least foundation in
the annals of international relations or of those between our neighbours
and ourselves. For we did sit down face-to-face with the representatives
of the Arab States at the time of the negotiations in Rhodes, and no one
dare profess that Arab honour was thereby affronted.
There is no precedent of a conflict between nations being brought to
finality without direct negotiations. In the conflict between the Arabs
and Israel, the issue of direct negotiations goes to the very crux of the
matter. For the objective is to achieve peace and co-existence, and how
will our neighbours ever be able to live with us in peace if they refuse
to speak with us at all?
From the start of the conversations with Ambassador Jarring, we agreed
that the face-to-face discussions should take place under the auspices of
the Secretary-General's envoy. During 1968, Dr. Jarring sought to bring
the parties together under his chairmanship in a neutral place. In March
1968, he proposed that we meet Egypt and Jordan in Nicosia. We agreed, but
the Arabs did not. In the same year, and again in September 1969, we
expressed our consent to his proposal that the meetings be held in the
manner of the Rhodes talks, which comprised both face-to-face and indirect
talks; a number of times it seemed that the Arabs and the Soviets would
also fall in with that proposal, but, in the end, they went back on it.
Only those who deny the right of another State to exist, or who want to
avoid recognizing the fact of its sovereignty, can develop the refusal to
talk to it into an inculcated philosophy of life which the pupil swears to
adhere to as to a political, national principle. The refusal to talk to us
directly is damning evidence that the unwillingness of the Arab leaders to
be reconciled with the very being of Israel is the basic reason why peace
is still to seek.
I am convinced that it is unreal and utopian to think that using the word
"withdrawal" will pave the way to peace. True, those among us who do
believe that the magic of that word is likely to bring us nearer to peace
only mean withdrawal after peace is achieved and then only to secure and
agreed boundaries demarcated in a peace treaty. On the other hand, when
Arab and Soviet leaders talk of "withdrawal", they mean complete and
outright retreat from all the administered territories, and from
Jerusalem, without the making of a genuine peace and without any agreement
on new permanent borders, but with an addendum calling for Israel's
consent to the return of all the refugees.
Israel's policy is clear, and we shall continue to clarify it at every
suitable opportunity, as we have done in the United Nations and elsewhere.
No person dedicated to truth could misinterpret our policy: when we speak
of secure and recognized boundaries, we do not mean that, after peace is
made, the Israel Defence Forces should be deployed beyond the boundaries
agreed upon in negotiations with our neighbours. No one could be
misled--Israel desires secure and recognized boundaries with its
neighbours.
Israel's Defence Forces have never crossed its borders in search of
conquest, but only when the safeguarding of the existence and bounds of
our State demanded it. Nasser's claim that Israel wishes to maintain the
cease-fire only so as to freeze the cease-fire lines is preposterous. The
cease-fire is necessary not to perpetuate the lines, but to prevent death
and destruction, to make progress easier towards a peace resting upon
secure and recognized boundaries. It is necessary as a step upwards on the
ladder to peace. Incessant gunfire is a step downward on the ladder to
war.
The question is crystal-clear, and there is no point in clouding it with
semantics--or in trying to escape from reality. There is not a single
article in Israel's policy which prevents the making of peace. Nothing is
lacking for the making of peace but the Arab persistence in denying
Israel's very right to exist. Arab refusal to acquiesce in our existence
in the Middle East, alongside the Arab States, abides. The only way to
peace is through a change in that recalcitrance.
When it changes, there will no longer be any obstacle to peace
negotiations. Otherwise, no formulae, sophistry or definitions will avail.
Those in the world who seek peace would do well to heed this basic fact
and help to bring about a change in the obdurate Arab approach, which is
the real impediment to peace. Any display of "understanding" and
forgiveness, however unwitting, is bound to harden the Arabs in their
obstinacy and hearten them in their gainsaying of Israel's right to exist,
and will, besides, be exploited by Arab leaders to justify ideologically
the continuance of the war against Israel.
Nothing unites our people more than the desire for peace. There is no
stronger urge in Israel, and on joyful occasions and in hours of mourning
alike it is expressed. Nothing can wrench out of our hearts or out of our
policy this wish for peace, this hope of peace--not even our indignation
over the killing of our loved ones, not even the enmity of the rulers of
the Arab world.
The victories that we have won have never intoxicated us, or filled us
with such complacency as to relinquish the wish and call for peace--a
peace that means goodneighbourly relations, cooperation and an end to
slaughter. Peace and co-existence with the Arab peoples have been, and
are, among the fundamentals of Jewish renaissance. Generations of the
Zionist movement were brought up on them. The desire for peace has charted
the policy of all Israel's Governments, of whatever membership. No
Government of Israel in power, however constituted, has ever blocked the
way to peace.
With all my heart, I am convinced that in Israel, in the future as in the
past, there could be no Government which would not bespeak the people's
cardinal and steadfast aspiration to bring about a true and enduring
peace.
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